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Russian Policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa:
Disengagement or Cooperation?
Summary
After several decades of expanding involvement and influence in Africa, the Soviet Union 
disengaged from the continent in the 1980s as part of the global retrenchment associated with 
Gorbachev's domestic economic reforms and "new thinking" in foreign and security policy. After 
the collapse of the Soviet state Russia continued its retreat from Africa. In 1994, however, Moscow 
began to reassess the implications of this withdrawal and announced its interest in reestablishing 
ties with the countries of the continent - ties that would focus on mutually beneficial economic 
relations. However, the poor financial situation of many African states will likely impede the 
implementation of Russia's plans for expanded economic involvement. Moreover, Russian political 
involvement is likely to remain limited, given the centrality of Russia's political and economic 
problems at home and in the "near abroad."
The Collapse of Soviet African Policy in the 1980s
From the beginning of the Cold War the most fundamental factor that motivated Soviet policy in Africa, as 
well as in other regions of the Third World, was the global competition for influence with the United States. 
Indeed, immediately after the decision to abandon Stalin's Eurocentric policy orientation in the mid-1950s 
the Soviets took a steady course in attempting to expand their involvement, influence, and power projection 
capabilities  on the  African  continent.1 Relatively  limited  in  the  1960s,  Soviet  influence  in  Africa  was 
substantially  strengthened  in  the  1970s,  especially  in  Angola,  Mozambique,  Ethiopia,  and  other  self-
proclaimed Marxist states. Soviet support proved to be essential in either bringing to power or consolidating 
1 See, for example, Roger E. Kanet, "Security Issues in Soviet African Policy: The Imperatives of Soviet Security Policy in Soviet-
African Relations," Crossroads: An International Socio-Political Journal, no. 10 (1983), pp. 81-120.
a number of African regimes that  were friendly toward and  dependent  upon the  USSR.  In Angola  and 
Ethiopia,  the  Soviet  Union  demonstrated  the  capability  of  providing  allies  with  significant  military 
assistance and proved that this assistance could be adequate to change the local balance of power in favor of 
the recipients of Soviet support. In return, the Soviets acquired access to naval and air facilities that might 
prove to be useful in potential conflicts with the West.1
The Soviet  successes of the  1970s,  however,  were  not  followed  by comparable  gains in  the  following 
decade.2 For Moscow the 1980s were characterized  by a significant  decline in its relations with Africa, 
even with some of its closest Marxist-Leninist allies. Besides the growing concern about the drain on the 
Soviet  economy resulting from costly ideologically-motivated  commitments to  African  and  other Third 
World clients, the initial  triumph of national  liberation movements in coming to power was followed by 
their largely unsuccessful efforts to create and consolidate viable political-economic systems. Rather than 
representing the ongoing attraction of Soviet-oriented communism, as had been claimed, these regimes were 
a  growing drain  on Soviet  economic  and  military resources.  Numerous studies have shown that  Soviet 
decision-makers in the 1980s were increasingly concerned with the staggering costs of maintaining their 
"empire" and providing economic,  as well  as military,  assistance to their weak and unstable allies.3 It is 
essential to recall that the growing costs of the Soviet overseas empire occurred precisely at the time that 
the  Soviet  economy  had  begun  to  suffer  from falling  economic  growth  rates.4 As  a  result,  Moscow 
eventually reneged on many of its African commitments and disengaged from the continent in favor of the 
development of its own economy and of ameliorating its relations with the West which was seen as the only 
source of the technology and investment capital required by for Soviet economic rejuvenation.5
Thus, in the last years of the Soviet Union's existence, when the declining superpower was plagued by a 
rapidly deepening economic crisis and the Cold War was coming to an end, Africa was widely perceived by 
the Soviet political elite as a region of peripheral importance. Many established ties were curtailed or even 
eliminated,  as the  costly ideological  foundation of Soviet  relations with African states was replaced  by 
pragmatic cost-benefit  calculations. In the words of one Russian specialist on Africa, Mikhail  Gorbachev 
with his emphasis on "new thinking" presided over the "collapse" of the USSR's African policy.6 
Russia's Disengagement from Africa
The policy of disengagement from the African continent continued after the Soviet Union's disintegration in 
December 1991.  Such a development was not surprising since the same economic problems that  forced 
communists  to  relinquish their  external  empire  persisted  and  intensified  in  the  democratizing  Russian 
Federation. Indeed,  numerous vehement debates about how to extricate  the Russian Federation from the 
ongoing economic crisis revealed a striking similarity between otherwise unreconcilable positions - almost 
all experts agreed that Russia's domestic economic misfortunes had been greatly exacerbated, if not caused, 
by Moscow's extremely costly ties with the Third World, and especially with Africa.7
Based  on such a  virtual  consensus among his advisors,  Russian President  Boris  Yeltsin's initial  policy 
towards Africa did nothing to stop the continuation of the massive Soviet retreat from the continent. Thus, 
for example, two months after Foreign Minister's tour of Africa in February 1992 Moscow closed Russian 
embassies in nine African countries - Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Liberia, Niger, Sao-Tome 
and Principe,  Togo, Somalia,  and Sierra Leone.  Shortly afterwards, consulates in Mozambique,  Angola, 
1 For a discussion of the importance of basing rights in Soviet Third World Policy, see Robert E. Harkavy, Great Power Competition 
for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon, 1982), especially pp. 173-204, 233-9.
2 See Roger E. Kanet, "The Evolution of Soviet Policy toward the Developing World from Stalin to Brezhnev," in Edward A. 
Kolodziej  and  Roger E. Kanet,  eds.,  The Limits of  Soviet  Power  in the  Developing World: Thermidor  in the  Revolutionary 
Struggle (London: Macmillan Press, 1989), pp. 36-60. 
3 See, for example, Daniel R. Kempton  and Roger E. Kanet, "Soviet Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Prospects and Problems for 
Model and Ally Strategies," in Jane Shapiro Zacek, ed., The Gorbachev Generation: Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy (New York:
Paragon Press, 1988), pp. 179-224.
4 A group of US analysts estimated that the costs of Soviet empire (including subsidies to African allies) had reached somewhere 
between $35 billion and $46 billion annually by 1980. Cited in Kanet, "The Evolution of Soviet Policy toward the Developing 
World from Stalin to Brezhnev," p. 56.
5 Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and the Third World," Foreign Affairs, LXIV (1986), pp. 715-731.
6 A. Kiva, "Afrika: i zdes zanovo?" Literaturnaia Gazeta, no. 21 (May 29, 1991). Cited in Robert G. Patman, "Russia's New Agenda 
in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Peter Shearman, ed., Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 285.
7 See Grigori Karassin, "Russia and Africa," International Affairs, no. 1 (January 1993), pp. 52-60.
Madagascar, and the Congo were also closed.1
It is important  to note that,  unlike  such countries as France and Britain that  possess a wide network of 
diversified cultural  and economic contacts with African nations, the Russian Federation could not close 
down its  official  missions there  without  significant  political  costs.  As emphasized  by Grigori  Karassin, 
Chief of the Department of Africa of the Russian Ministry of International Relations, besides the remaining 
embassies  and  some  trade  missions,  the  Russian  Federation  currently  does  not  have  in  Africa  "any 
additional receptors to perceive the processes taking place there, to say nothing of having a foothold for the 
establishment of a new structure of cooperation."2
Moreover, it  was not only political  and military cooperation between Russia and African states that  was 
drastically curtailed; many economic ties were also cut. Thus, while in 1992 the amount of Russian trade 
with Africa exceeded $1 billion, in 1993 it declined to $ 760 million. Furthermore, according to Russia's 
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin,  the pattern of Russian trade with the continent has been severely 
distorted, with 83% of Russian-African commercial flows confined to the few countries of Northern Africa.3 
Worried  about  the  process  of  shrinking  cooperation,  four  African  ambassadors  (from Senegal,  Ghana, 
Zimbabwe,  and  Madagascar)  accredited  in  Moscow made  a  deliberate  effort  to  seek  assurances  from 
Moscow authorities that Russia was not "turning away from Africa."4 It appears, however, that, despite such 
calls for a more active engagement, Russian foreign policy towards Africa in the first few years after the 
Soviet  Union's collapse was characterized  by a  massive retreat  in the  political,  military,  and  economic 
realms. In fact, in the monetary area Russia undermined its standing in Africa by cutting off all economic 
assistance  to  African  recipients  and  demanding  the  immediate  repayment  of  their  outstanding  debt  by 
African states.5
Russia Returns to Africa?
And yet, even as the Russians were withdrawing from the continent, they also made evident their interest in 
the long-term prospects for beneficial commercial relations with the countries of Southern Africa . By 1994 
Moscow's attitude towards the African continent experienced a major shift. Reassessing the prospects for 
cooperation with African nations and realizing the far-reaching strategic losses associated with the policy of 
complete disengagement from the region, Russian decision-makers have begun to voice discontent with the 
abrupt deterioration of ties with Africa. It has been repeatedly argued that, in contrast with the previous era 
of unilateral  assistance  which was driven  by ideological  concerns and  the  dynamics of the  superpower 
rivalry, new Russian-African relations should be mutually beneficial and based on pragmatic interests.
Among the important events that accelerated this shift in Russian perceptions of Africa was a conference of 
Russian ambassadors to African countries held in Moscow in summer 1994.  Addressing the conference, 
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin emphasized the fact that the prolonged pause in relations with 
Africa  had  had  an  adverse  impact  on  Russia's  interests.  Being  remarkably  explicit  about  Moscow's 
pragmatic goals on the African continent, in particular in the area of arms trade, he noted that "the resulting 
vacuum is being actively filled by other countries, including those that make Russian weapons under license 
and of a quality nowhere near that  offered by our producers."6 Expressing essentially the same concern, 
Russian  Foreign  Minister  Andrei  Kozyrev  was  more  cautious,  however.  Thus,  in  his  speech  at  the 
conference, Kozyrev talked about the need to "combine organically" the expansion of Russian arms sales 
with the enhancement of international security on the African continent.7
Although military cooperation  between Moscow and  Africa  has deteriorated  substantially  over the  last 
decade and the Russian Federation has to start virtually from scratch, there is a large number of factors that  
are remain conducive to the sale of Russian arms in Africa. Most importantly, about 60%, and in some cases 
1 Robert Patman, "Russia's New Agenda in Sub-Saharan Africa," p. 292.
2 Grigori Karassin, "Russia and Africa," p. 59.
3 Cited in Vladimir Abarinov, "Novii afrikanskii kurs: vzyskat' nedoimku i razvernut' eksport oruzhiya," Segodnya (22 July, 1994).
4 Izvestiia (November 10, 1992).
5 Moscow Radio  World  Service (January  24, 1993); cited  in Patman,  "Russia's  New Agenda  in Sub-Saharan  Africa," p.  292; 
Izvestiia (March 7, 1992.
6 ITAR-TASS (July 12, 1994).
7 Abarinov, "Novii afrikanskii kurs."
almost  90%,  of  military  equipment  currently  used  by  African  armies  was  manufactured  in  Russia.1 
According to Chernomyrdin,  there existed  an imperative  to "step up activity and efficiency" in moving 
Russian weaponry into the African market without forgetting, however, about the actual needs of the clients 
and their ability to pay.2 However, efforts to reestablish Russian arms exports have faced  several  severe 
problems - including the reduced capacity of African states to pay for weapons imports and the competition 
with both Western and CIS weapons exporters.3 The most promising market for Russian military exports is 
South Africa, which has been interested in purchasing MiG 19 engines.4
In fact,  the  poor  financial  status of  many African  nations may substantially  impede  Russia's plans for 
expanding economic  involvement  in the  region even beyond the  area  of military sales.  The problem is 
complicated by the existing indebtedness of African countries to the former USSR (and now to Russia) - in 
1993 sub-Saharan nations alone owed Moscow about $19 billion.5 It is clear that the majority of African 
nations will not be able to repay all their debts to the Russian Federation. And yet,  Russia remains quite 
persistent in trying to convert Africa's debt into direct investments or to use it to cover the costs of Russian 
official missions on the continent.
Confronted with serious debt repayment problems, Moscow is focusing its attention primarily on the most 
economically capable countries of the region that either extract oil (e.g., Nigeria) or supply important raw 
resources (e.g., Zimbabwe). According to Russian decision-makers, however, their most important economic 
partner on the continent is South Africa. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
two countries in February 1992, Russia has repeatedly expressed its interest in cooperating with the South 
African  Republic  which  possesses the  largest  economic  and  commercial  potential  in  the  region.  The 
prospects for cooperation between the two countries are indeed bright. For example, it has been noted many 
times that, if Russia and South Africa coordinate their policies, they will be in a position to shape world 
prices on diamonds and, to a substantial degree, on gold.6 Moreover, Russian leaders have seen South Africa 
as an alternative  source of food and  feed  grains. In 1994  Russian President  Boris Yeltsin  revoked  all 
restrictions on cooperation with South Africa  which had  been imposed  some time  ago following a  UN 
Security Council  resolution. Moreover, in his decree Yeltsin specifically encouraged the formation of all 
state, public, and private ties with the South African Republic on the mutually advantageous basis.7
Despite  the  plans  for  more  active  economic  cooperation  with  African  nations,  Russia  has  been  quite 
reluctant, however, to involve itself politically and militarily in settling the ongoing conflicts in the region. 
Although President Yeltsin has announced on a number of occasions that "as a permanent member of the 
UN Security  Council  and  an active  participant  in the  international  community,  the  Russian Federation 
supports democratic transformations in Africa and turning it into a zone of peace, calm and stable economic 
development," so far Russia,  facing political,  economic,  and security problems of its own, has refrained 
from making any specific commitments to preserving peace and stability on the African continent.8 In the 
words of one Russian expert, "they [Africans] should understand that Russia has to bear practically alone 
the burden of peacekeeping in the Commonwealth of Independent States."9
The Future of Russian-African Relations
Given the recent shift of Russian policy towards Africa, it is reasonable to assume that Russia will be quite 
active in attempting to reestablish its economic presence on the African continent. This time, however, such 
a presence will be driven by purely pragmatic calculations rather than by some ideological imperative. Such 
a trend will  certainly continue to cause feelings of discontent  among Moscow's former Marxist-Leninist 
1 Vyacheslav Elagin, "Nam ne stoit teriat' Afriku," Krasnaiia Zvezda (August 8, 1994).
2 ITAR-TASS (12 July 1994).
3  Interfax, August 11, 1992; translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Sov-92-158.
4 Krasnaia zvezda, December 15, 1993.
5 Elagin, "Nam ne stoit teriat' Afriku.".
6 Maxim Yusin, "Rossiyskaya diplomatiia otkryvaet dlia sebia Yuzhnuiu Afriku," Izvestiia (March 4, 1992). In 1992 the De Beers 
company opened an office in Moscow; although problems of Russian-South African competition in the area of diamond and gold 
exports  were reported,  by early 1994 efforts  seems successful in reaching an agreement. See "Moscow Visit Alerts Diamond 
World," Africa Analysis (September 4, 1992), p. 11; ITAR-TASS, April 26, 1993.
7 Radio Russia  (July 12, 1994); Russia  established  a center for  Russian  studies  in Capetown  in 1994. See Zurab Nalbandian, 
"Moskva s vidom na Antarktidu," Rossiiskaia gazeta, (September 1, 1994).
8 ITAR-TASS (July 12, 1994).
9 Elagin, "Nam ne stoit teriat' Afriku.".
allies in Africa who had become accustomed to soft credits and easy loans. And yet,  the ability to break 
with ideological rigidities of the past also creates the opportunity for Russia to establish mutually beneficial 
contacts with more financially secure, market-oriented African economies, such as that in South Africa.
Political  involvement  of  the  Russian  Federation  on the  African  continent  is  likely  to  remain  limited, 
however.  Preoccupied  with  numerous  security  problems  in  the  "near  abroad"  and  socio-economic 
misfortunes at home, Russia, at least in the near future, will not be able to claim the role of the major player 
in  African  politics.  Nevertheless,  if  successful,  Russia's  increasing  economic  activities  in  Africa,  in 
particular in the area of arms trade, will eventually form a basis on which Moscow can potentially re-assert 
its political power on the continent. 
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